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FREE-SPEECH RIGHTS: WHY CONGRESS
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war against Germany, entering into a great European conflict that historians would later refer to as
World War IV While at war, the U.S. government sought a measure to punish those who jeopardized America's national defense.' Thus, Congress
enacted the Espionage Act ("Act") 3 with the declared purpose of protecting
the rights and property of American citizens, while punishing crimes "that
endangered the peace, welfare, and honor of the United States."4
According to the legislative history, "[t]he object [of the Act] is not to
restrict an American citizen in any just rights he has under the Constitution
and laws of this Nation." 5 However, contrary to the stated intent, the language of the statute restricts the rights of American citizens, particularly
with respect to fundamental liberties under the First Amendment.6 Critics
I J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank Steve Klitzman for his expertise and assistance throughout the
writing process, along with my editors on CommLaw Conspectus for their tremendous
guidance. I would also like to thank my parents, Lisa and Gary Epstein, and my fiance,
Andrea Kramer, for their infinite love and support.
See ADRIAN 0. VAN WYEN, NAVAL AVIATION IN WORLD WAR I 6 (1969), availableat
htt 1 ://www.history.navy.mil/branches/wwlav.htm.
See 55 CONG. REc. 1695 (1917).
18 U.S.C. §§ 791-799 (2000).
4 Jereen Trudell, The Constitutionality of Section 793 of the Espionage Act and Its
Application to Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 205, 206 (1986) (citing 55 CONG. REC. 1695
(1917)).
5 55 CONG. REc. 1695.
6
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of the Espionage Act argue that it is notably vague7 and facially overbroad,8 and therefore has a "chilling effect"' on free speech. Accordingly,
Congress should revise the Espionage Act to more effectively carry out the
Act's purpose: to protect the national defense and security of the United
States without undermining the fundamental First Amendment rights of
American citizens.
The need for this revision is even more compelling because freedom of
the press in this country has drastically eroded in recent years.' According
to Reporters Without Borders journalistic freedom in the United States
now pales in comparison with journalistic freedom in Northern European
countries." In the first annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index, issued in
2002, the United States ranked seventeenth. 2 Today, the United States
ranks fifty-third, having dropped nine places just since last year. 3 Reporters Without Borders contends that this drastic decline of press freedom in
the United States occurred because the Bush administration "use[s] the
pretext of 'national security' to regard as suspicious any journalist who
question[s] the 'war on terrorism."",14 If Congress does not revise the Espionage Act, the Bush administration or a subsequent administration could
use this law to prosecute American journalists. In the event such prosecution occurs, the United States would descend further in the Worldwide
Press Freedom Index rankings which could jeopardize the country's reputation as "leader of the free world."
This Note examines United States v. Rosen, 5 a pending and controversial
prosecution of two lobbyists under Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act

1:05CR225 (E.D. Va. Filed Mar. 31, 2006) (arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) is facially
overbroad and vague). See infra note 93 for text of Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act.
7 Editorial, EspionageActing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2006, at A8 ("The statute is notably vague, meaning it is ripe for selective prosecution and misuse against political or partisan enemies.").
8

Editorial, A Leaky EspionageLaw, PALM

BEACH POST,

Aug. 18, 2006, at 20A (refer-

ring to the Espionage Act as an unconstitutionally broad law).
9 A chilling effect is "[t]he result of a law or practice that seriously discourages the
exercise of a constitutional right, such as the right to appeal or the right of free speech."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (8th ed. 2004).
10 See Nora Boustany, Press Freedom Erodes in U.S., Report Says, WASH. POST, Oct.
24, 2006, at A15.
1 Id. "Northern European countries top the index with no reported censorship, intimidation or physical reprisals, either by officials or the public, in Finland, Ireland, Iceland and
the Netherlands." Id. Reporters Without Borders is a news media advocacy organization
that issues the Worldwide Press Freedom Index, an annual report which tracks actions
against news media See http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id-rubrique 20.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.(reporting on Reporters Without Borders).
15 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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that has broad free-speech implications. 16 Part II considers the legislative
history of the Espionage Act and the appellate decisions that have analyzed
and interpreted its statutory language prior to this critical case. Part III provides an overview of Rosen, in which presiding U.S. District Judge T.S.
Ellis III suggested "that the time is ripe for Congress to engage in a thorough review and revision" of Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act. 17 Part
IV examines Section 793(e) under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
of First Amendment jurisprudence and argues that in spite of the fact that
courts have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Act itself, the
statute's provisions inhibit constitutionally protected speech. Part V proposes legislative solutions to more effectively protect the fundamental right
to freedom of speech for all Americans without endangering the national
defense and security of the United States. Part V concludes that there is a
low probability that Congress will act on these proposals.
II. THE EVOLVING ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
ESPIONAGE ACT
A. Legislative History
The Espionage Act of 1917 became law after nine weeks of grueling, divisive, and impassioned congressional debate. 8 The pertinent part of the
original statute made it a crime when the nation was at war for any person:
(a) willfully to 'make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere' with the military success of the United States or 'to promote the success of its
enemies'; (b) willfully to 'cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States'; or (c) willfully to 'obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.'19

Lawmakers and judges have characterized this language as ambiguous
from the start. During congressional deliberations prior to the Act's passage, Senator William Borah noted, "I have not found any two Senators

16

Walter Pincus, Ruling Raises Bar in Lobbyists' Case: Government Now Must Prove

FormerAIPAC Workers Intended to Harm U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2006, at A4.
17 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
18 Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Handand the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI.L. REv. 335, 352 (2003) [hereinafter Stone, Espionage Act]; see also
Letter from Geoffrey R. Stone, Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School, to Rep. Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Rep. Jane Harman, Ranking Member, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (May 19, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stone, Letter]
(summarizing legislative history of Espionage Act of 1917).
19 Stone, Espionage Act, supra note 18, at 352 (quoting Espionage Act of June 15,
1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-799 (2000))).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 15

who agree upon what [the Act] means."2 In addition, some members of
Congress at the time considered the statutory language not only vague, but
also a serious impediment to the First Amendment. In a House Judiciary
Committee hearing, Representative Charles Eaton voiced concern over the
"distinct vagueness among the members of the committee as to how far
this abridgment of speech is going."2
However, the Espionage Act, as originally presented by the Woodrow
Wilson administration, proposed a much broader abridgment of speech
than the Act Congress eventually passed.22 President Wilson's version contained a "press censorship" provision which provoked heated discussion
among members of the national legislature.23 This provision sought to
make it unlawful for any individual in a time of war "to publish any information that the President, in his judgment, declared to be 'of such character
that it is or might be useful to the enemy."' 2 The provision triggered extensive protest, especially from the press who argued that it would give the
President final authority to determine whether they could publish information about war.2
Congressional opposition to the press censorship provision was also
fierce.26 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge expressed concern "that the government officials who would administer this provision would naturally be
inclined to use their authority to censor legitimate public criticism."27 This
concern implied that the provision was unconstitutionally vague and therefore had significant potential for political abuse. The House of Representatives defeated President Wilson's press censorship provision by a vote of
184 to 144.28 Nevertheless, the Act that Congress eventually passed was
anything but immune from subsequent First Amendment challenges.

20

65 CONG. REc. 2120 (1917) (statement of Sen. Borah); Stone, Espionage Act, supra

note 18, at 353 (quoting Senator Borah).
21 Espionage and Intelligence with Neutrality: Hearing on H.R. 291 Before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 25 (1917) (statement of Representative Charles
Eaton), 1st Sess, Hearings on HR 291 at 19-25 (Apr. 9 & 12, 1917); Stone, EspionageAct,
supra note 18, at 354 (quoting Rep. Eaton).
22 Stone, EspionageAct, supra note 18, at 346.
23 Id.; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOus TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 146-49 (2004) (describing the debate over press censorship provision).
24 See Stone, EspionageAct, supra note 18, at 345 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1695 (1917)
(statement of Rep. Morgan)).
25 Stone, EspionageAct, supra note 18, at 346.
THE SEDITION ACT OF

26

Id. at 347.

Id. at 348. (quoting Senator Lodge); Stone, Letter, supra note 18.
See Stone, Espionage Act, supra note 18, at 349 (citing House Defeats Censorship
Law by 184 to 144, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1917 (reporting that the bill's defeat shattered party
lines)).
27

28
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B. Schenck v. United States: The Constitutional Challenges Begin
Charles T. Schenck, the general secretary of the Socialist party in 1917,
was the first individual to challenge the constitutionality of the Espionage
Act after his conviction on charges of conspiracy to violate its provisions.2 9
According to the U.S. government, Schenck attempted to obstruct military
recruitment during World War I by printing and circulating leaflets urging
American men not to submit to the military draft.3 ° Schenck appealed for
reversal of his conviction, arguing that the Espionage Act contravened the
First Amendment's prohibition of making any law abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.3
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., acknowledged that Schenck's actions would have been protected by his First Amendment rights in most cases; however, "the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.,

32

Jus-

tice Holmes elaborated, explaining that
[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of prox33
imity and degree.

The Court reasoned that the Constitution was of no avail to Schenck because the nation was at war and his actions hindered the war effort.34 Thus,
the Espionage Act survived the first of what would be many subsequent
constitutional challenges because the government's compelling interest in
the national defense under the "clear and present danger" balancing test
outweighed individual civil liberty. 5

29

See Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919).

30

See id. at 49-51.

See id.at 49, 51.
Id. at 52 (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205, 206 (1904)).
33 Id (establishing the "clear and present danger" test). The clear and present danger
doctrine "determines whether certain speech crosses the line from permissible advocacy to
improper incitement to violence." Holly S. Hawkins, Note, A Sliding Scale Approach for
Evaluating the Terrorist Threat over the Internet, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633, 634 (2005).
The clear and present danger doctrine, although reformulated since Schenck, remains good
law today. See e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[t]he clear and present danger of Schenk v. United States..
•evolved into the modem incitement rule of Brandenburgv. Ohio.... (internal citations
omitted)).
34 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
35 See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). See also Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (rejecting claim that Espionage Act violates the First Amendment by interfering with free speech).
31
32
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C. Abrams v. United States: Justice Holmes Clashes with the Supreme
Court over the Espionage Act
In a subsequent 1919 decision, Abrams v. UnitedStates, a majority of the
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's verdict that found Jacob Abrams and
his coconspirators guilty of violating the Espionage Act.36 The Court reasoned that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that the defendants intended to incite resistance to the war and curtail
production of ammunition.37 The defendants had been convicted on
charges of conspiring to violate the Sedition Act,38 a provision of the Espionage Act, by printing and distributing 5,000 pamphlets that contained
"disloyal" language about the United States government during a time of
war.39 The Sedition Act prohibited: communicating with the intent to obstruct the selling of war bonds;40 uttering, printing, writing, or publishing
"any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" with the intent to
cause contempt or scorn for the form of the United States government, the
Constitution, or the flag;4' urging the curtailment of production of war materials with the intent to hinder the war effort; or uttering any words

36

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

31 Id. at 617, 619, 624.
38

Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch.

136, 61 Stat. 1359).
39 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617-18.
40 Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, sec. 3.
Whoever, when the United States is at war... shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements, or say or do anything except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with intent to obstruct the sale by the United
States of bonds or other securities of the United States or the making of loans by or to
the United States, . . . shall be punished ....
Id.
41 Id.
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or
naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States,... or the uniform of
the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute,.
. shall be punished ....
Id.
42

[W]hoever... shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language
spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this country of any
thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the
war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to
cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war,... shall be punished
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which supported the cause of a country at war with the United States or
which opposed the cause of the United States. 3
The defendants in Abrams argued that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional because it inherently conflicted with the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press." The majority of the Court,
citing Schenck, rejected this argument, holding that the Sedition Act did
not violate First Amendment rights, and that the federal government could
impose criminal sanctions on speech that presented a clear and present
danger to the United States.4 Interestingly, Justice Holmes, the author of
the Schenck opinion, disagreed with the Abrams holding.
In dissent, Justice Holmes argued that the Espionage Act was not immune from First Amendment scrutiny. 46 He distinguished Abrams from
Schenck, explaining that Abrams and his coconspirators did not intend to
pose an imminent clear and present danger to the United States.4 7 According to Holmes, "[i]t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned."48 Justice Holmes'
dissent enunciated an imminence and bad faith requirement to Espionage
Act prosecutions which fueled subsequent constitutional challenges under
the First Amendment, and engendered rivalries and alliances among members of the Supreme Court.4 9
D. Schaefer v. United States and Pierce v. United States: Justices Holmes
and Brandeis Form an Alliance on "Clear and Present Danger"
During World War I, the United States government prosecuted more than
2,000 individuals under the Espionage Act."0 By the end of 1919, the Supreme Court had heard a number of First Amendment challenges from
individual defendants convicted under the Act, including Schenck and
Abrams, and had upheld all of their convictions.5" In 1920, however, JusId. [Wihoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with
which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the Untied States
therein, shall be punished .... Id.
44 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618-19.
45 Id. The Court explicitly cited Schenck when it rejected the defendants' First Amendment argument: "This contention is sufficiently discussed and is definitely negatived in
Schenck v. United States ... "Id. at 619.
46 See id.at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47 See id. at 624-31 (Homes, J., dissenting).
43

48

Id. at 628.

See Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252
U.S. 239, 253 (1920).
50 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law ofArmed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV., 675, 698-99 (2004).
51 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
49
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tice Brandeis joined Justice Holmes to dissent in decisions in which the
majority did not adopt the clear and present danger balancing approach
when the application of this test would have resulted in the reversal of the
defendants' convictions." These dissents triggered a jurisprudential approach that would become prevalent in later decisions. 3
1. Schaefer v. United States
In Schaefer v. United States, defendants appealed a conviction under
Section 3 of the 1917 Espionage Act5 4 for printing, publishing, and circulating newspapers that contained allegedly false reports and statements
about the United States' war effort against Germany. 5 A majority of the
Court found that the defendants' statements were deliberate and willfully
false, and that they engendered opposition toward the war.56 According to
the majority, this finding was 57
sufficient to uphold the defendants' convictions under the Espionage Act.
Justice Brandeis, however, wrote a dissent in which Justice Holmes
joined, arguing that the Court majority erred in failing to apply the clear
and present danger balancing test established in the unanimous Schenck
decision. 8 According to Brandeis, "[t]he question whether in a particular
instance the words spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment
of free speech is, under the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree...
"" Under this analysis, Brandeis found that the defendants' criticism of
the war was not a false report or false statement that had the potential to
interfere with the operation or success of the United States war effort or

52

See Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253-

73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53 See, e.g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941); New York Times Co. v. United
States (PentagonPapers),403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. Rosen, 445 F.
Sup4p. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies
and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval
forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be
punished ....
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 791799 (2000)).
55 See Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 468.
56

Id. at 480-81.

5" Id.at 482.
58 See id.
at 482-83 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" Id.at 483.
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promote the enemy's success. 60 Instead, Brandeis found that the defendants' criticism of the war was speech that deserved protection under the
First Amendment. 6' He reasoned that the prosecution of war criticism
which lacks potential to incite conduct that could hinder the war effort
would discourage the critical commentary of government found at the core
of the First Amendment's protections.6 2 The reasoning of Justices Brandeis
and Holmes was entirely consistent with dicta from the latter's Abrams
dissent: a court should always be vigilant against attempts to prohibit the
expression of speech that criticizes the government, unless such censorship
is "required to save the country.

2. Pierce v. United States
In Pierce v. United States, the defendants were convicted of circulating
pamphlets containing statements that both incited opposition to World War
I and the U.S. government, and were calculated to interfere with the morale
of American troops. 64 The Supreme Court upheld the District Court's finding that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction.6 5 The majority
again gave deference to the trial court's determination without subjecting it
to the clear and present danger test.66
In another dissenting opinion joined by Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis
reemphasized the need for the Court to apply the Schenck clear and present
danger test. 67 Brandeis also questioned the unresolved issue of "whether
the act of uttering or publishing was done willfully, that is, with the intent
to produce the result which the Congress sought to prevent. 6 ' Brandeis'
focus on intent in Pierce was a derivative of Justice Holmes' dissent in
See id. at 492-93. According to Justice Brandeis, the only kind of false statements
covered by the Espionage Act were
[w]illfully untrue statements which might mislead the people as to the financial condition of the government and thereby embarrass it; as to the adequacy of the preparations
for war or the support of the forces; as to the sufficiency of the food supply; or willfully untrue statements or reports of military operations which might mislead public
opinion as to the competency of the army and navy or its leader; or willfully untrue
statements or reports which might mislead officials in the execution of the law, or
military authorities in the disposition of the forces ....
Id. (citation omitted).
60

61
62

Id. at 482.
Id. at 493-94.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
United States v. Pierce, 245 F. 878, 881-82 (N.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 252 U.S. 239
(1920).
65 See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 251 (1920) (concluding that the
District
Court would have erred if it had directed an acquittal because substantial evidence existed
in support of the charges).
66 See id. (failing to use clear and present danger test in analysis of majority opinion).
67 See id. at 255 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68 Id.
63
64
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Abrams, in which he stated that "[i]t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a
limit to the expression of opinion ....69 Justice Brandeis acknowledged
that "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty" were serious
crimes in the military or naval forces.7" However, he argued that the Pierce
defendants' convictions should be reversed because there was no clear and
present danger that these crimes would actually occur, given that the defendants did not distribute the pamphlets among members of the military
or the naval services. 7' Accordingly, Brandeis argued that the requisite evil
intent to bring about imminent danger was lacking." This element of bad
faith emphasized by Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes in their dissents
would surface in later cases in which courts required the prosecution to
prove such intent.73
These early Espionage Act cases demonstrate that Justice Holmes and
Justice Brandeis, two of the most venerable jurists in American history,
refused to deny First Amendment freedoms when convictions under the
Espionage Act were not supported by threat of imminent danger to the
United States or the presence of bad faith on the part of the individual
whose rights were at stake.74 The reoccurring dissents from these two legendary justices provided support for a subsequent decision that clarified the
language of the Espionage Act by ruling that a bad faith element is necessary for conviction.75
E. Gorin v. United States: The Supreme Court Rejects Claim that the Espionage Act is Unconstitutionally Vague
Shortly after Pierce, the Supreme Court held in Connally v. General
Construction Co. that a law is facially invalid for vagueness if persons "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application."76 The Court later elaborated that a law must convey "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
69
70

dissenting).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
Pierce,252 U.S. at 272-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

71

id.

72

See id.at 272.

73 See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (finding that the Espionage Act

punishes the release of classified information only when that release is the product of bad
faith); United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the
United States must prove that Rosen and Weissman disclosed the classified information in
bad faith).
74 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466, 482-95 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253-73
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75 See Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28.
76 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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common understanding and practices" to pass constitutional muster under
the vagueness doctrine.77 This standard was applied to the Espionage Act
in Gorin v. United States.78
In 1940, two decades after Pierce, a citizen of the U.S.S.R. sought and
received from a U.S. naval intelligence officer the substance of reports
concerning Japanese activities in the United States. 79 Both the Soviet citizen and the American officer conspired to transmit this information back to
the Soviet Union.8 ° Upon conviction under what is now codified as Section
794(a) of the Espionage Act, 8' the two coconspirators appealed to the Supreme Court on the argument that the 1917 law is unconstitutionally
vague.82 The Court rejected the defendants' vagueness challenge.83 In its
opinion, the Gorin majority adopted an approach articulated in the dissents
of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, holding that the Espionage Act
"requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith" with the reasonable
belief that such action could harm the United States.84 Therefore, the Court
held, the Espionage Act is not unconstitutionally vague because it is limited by intent and imminence.8

77

Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).

80

Gorin, 312 U.S. 19.
at 22.
See id.

81

Section 794(a) provides:

78

'9 Id.

Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or
transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver or transmit, to any foreign government,
or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether
recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer,
agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document,
writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint,
plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national
defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life, except that the sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is
no jury, the court, further, finds that the offense resulted in the identification by a foreign power (as defined in section 101(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978) of an individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in
the death of that individual, or directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation
against large-scale attack; war plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic
information; or any other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy.
18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
82 See Gorin, 312 U.S. at 23.
83

See id.
at 28.

84 id.
85 See id.; see also supra note 81 for text of Section 794(a) of the Espionage
Act regarding intent and imminence requirements.
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F. New York Times Co. v. United States: The Supreme Court Gives Deference to the First Amendment
Even three decades after Gorin, the dissents of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis still influenced the Supreme Court in cases concerning the
interplay between the First Amendment and the Espionage Act. In a 1971
plurality decision, the Couvt in New York Times Co. v. United States confirmed Holmes and Brandeis's overarching argument that First Amendment interests must prevail over the government's interest in national security where the threat to national security is slight and explicit rights under
the First Amendment, such as freedom of the press, are at stake. 6 New
' 87
York Times Co. v. United States, also known as the "Pentagon Papers
case, is perhaps the most famous decision to address leaks to the press of
classified information concerning national security.8
Prior to this decision, Congress passed the Internal Security Act of
195089 which amended the Espionage Act of 1917 and remains part of the
Espionage Act today.90 The 1950 amendments were adopted in response to
the perceived threat to national security posed by the Communist movement.9' They expanded the scope of the 1917 Act by prohibiting the retention of classified information by someone who does not have lawful possession of such information, and by prohibiting the transmission of such
information by someone with lawful possession to someone without such
entitlement.9 2 Congress codified these prohibitions into Sections 793(d)
and (e) of the Espionage Act.93
86

See New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers),403 U.S. 713 (1971)

(per curiam).
87

See, e.g., Mitchell J. Michalec, Comment, The ClassifiedInformation ProtectionAct:

Killing the Messenger or Killing the Message?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 455, 459-60 (2003)

(referring to New York Times Co. v. United States as the Pentagon Papers case).
88

89

Trudell, supranote 4, at 209.
Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, 1003-04 (1950) (codified as

amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e) (2000)).
90 Trudell, supra note 4, at 205-11 (describing enactment and application of the Espionage Act).
91 Id.
92 Id. at

207 (explaining that the mere retention of defense information became a crime

under the amended Act).
93 Section 793(d) provides:
Whoever, lawfully having possession of access to, control over, or being entrusted
with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to
the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or
causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any
person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on

20071

Espionage Act

Violations of Sections 793(d) and (e) were at issue in the landmark Pentagon Papers case, 94 which involved a classified study obtained by the New
York Times and the Washington Post.95 Both newspapers sought to publish
excerpts of the multi-volume study, known as the "Pentagon Papers,"
which described the history of the nation's role in Indochina, and specifically American policy with respect to Vietnam. 96 In addition to seeking
injunctions against the newspapers, the government charged two individuals, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, with leaking this classified information to the press in violation of Sections 793(d) and (e) of the Espionage
Act. 97 However, the Department of Justice eventually dropped the prosecution of Ellsberg and Russo because the burglars involved in the Watergate
scandal had tainted the government's case when they also broke into the
office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. 98 The Court, therefore, only addressed the
issue of whether the government could enjoin the publication of news that
reporters obtained through an unauthorized transfer of classified information. 99

The plurality opinion held that to prevent publication of the Pentagon
Papers would have amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint on the
press. °° A prior restraint is "[a] governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression. Prior restraints violate the First
demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it ...[s]hall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (emphasis added).
Section 793(e) provides:
Whoever having unauthorizedpossession of access to, or control over any document,
writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint,
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason
to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause
to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to
receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee
of the United States entitled to receive it ...[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (emphasis added).
94 New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers),403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam).
" Id.at 714.
96 See id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
97 See Trudell, supra note 4, at 209-10. See also Michalec, supra note 87, at 459 (describing the events which led to the indictment of the newspapers and Ellsberg and Russo).
98 See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 523 n.503
(2002). See also Melville B. Nimmer, NationalSecurity Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues
Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1974) (discussing the fate of
the individuals involved in the Pentagon Papers case).
99 PentagonPapers,403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam).
'0oSee id.
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Amendment unless the speech is obscene, is defamatory, or creates a clear
and present danger to society."' 0 ' Although the Pentagon Papers contained
classified information relating to national security, a plurality of the Supreme Court found that the information did not rebut the presumption of
the unconstitutionality of a prior restraint on its publication.'0 2 Thus, the
Court's rejection of the government's attempt to stop publication was a
victory for American journalists and freedom of the press. 03
'
Although a plurality of justices ruled that the government could not enjoin publication, a separate coalition of justices hinted that the government°4
could still prosecute the newspapers for violating the Espionage Act.'
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the statute permits
prosecution of the newspapers after publication of the classified material.' 05
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, stated in his concurring opinion
that the "failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not
measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication."' 16 White elaborated that he "would have no difficulty in sustaining
convictions under [Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act] on facts that
would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior
restraint."'0 7
Significantly, Justice Harlan, in dissent, bluntly critiqued Section 793(e)
as "a singularly opaque statute."' 18 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit would eventually agree with this characterization in
United States v. Morison,"9 a case that addressed an issue that the Penta101BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (8th ed. 2004).
102 See PentagonPapers,403 U.S. at 714.
103 David H. Topol, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the FirstAmendment Right to
Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV.581, 586 (1992).
104"[T]he Government has the power under statutory grant to use traditional criminal
law to protect the country ...." Pentagon Papers,403 U.S. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring). "[F]ailure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication. That the Government mistakenly
chose to proceed by injunction does not mean that it could not successfully proceed in another way." Id.at 733 (White, J., concurring). See also Does the FirstAmendment's Freedom of the Press Clause Place the Institutional Media Above the Law of Classified Secrets?: HearingAddressing Obligationsof the Media With Respect to Publicationof Classified Information Before the H. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 6
(2006) (statement of Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community
Service, Chapman University School of Law). "[F]ive Justices in [the Pentagon Papers]
case (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Stewart, Harlan, and Blackmun), recognized
[that] . ..a prohibition on prior restraints does not eliminate liability for post-publication
prosecution ..."Id.
105 See PentagonPapers,403 U.S. at 743-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 733 (White, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 737.
108Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988).
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gon Papers case did not: whether Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act is
constitutionally applicable to individuals who leak classified information to
the press.
G. United States v. Morison: The Media and the Espionage Act Finally
Intertwine
United States v. Morison constituted the first successful prosecution of
an individual under the Espionage Act for leaking information to the media."1 0 Morison worked at the Naval Intelligence Support Center ("NISC")
from 1974 to 1984111 as a national intelligence officer."' With the approval
of the NISC, Morison also performed off-duty work for Jane 's Fighting
Ships, a British publication about international naval operations. 1 3 In 1984,
Morison mailed "Top Secret" American photos of a Soviet aircraft carrier
that was under construction to Jane's Defence Weekly ("Jane 's"), a magazine related to Jane's Fighting Ships. 114 The photographs, which had been

taken by an American KH-11 reconnaissance satellite camera, were published in Jane's and the Washington Post."5 Morison also sent Jane's a
government found secret military
summary of a secret report, and the U.S.
16
apartment.
Morison's
in
information
In a subsequent prosecution of Morison under the Espionage Act, the
government claimed that Morison's leaks confirmed the satellite's capability to the Soviet Union, a declared enemy of the United States, even though
it conceded that the Soviets already had access to some of the same photographs.l1 7 Morison argued that the fact that he disclosed information to the
press and not to a foreign government agent distinguished his case, and
that the court should accordingly find his actions did not fall under the
ambit of Sections 793(d) and (e). 118 In addition, Morison argued that criminal punishment of leaks to the press would render the Espionage Act unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.' 9 In support of this
claim, many newspapers filed amicus curiae briefs contending that a deci1"0

See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1066-67; Topol, supra note 103, at 590. See also Michalec,

supra note 87, at 473. "United States v. Morison[,] is extraordinarily important[,] because it
demonstrates the reasoning one court used to apply existing statutes to ... leaks of classified information from a government employee to the press." Id. at 472-73(citations omitted).
".. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060.
112 Id. at 1083.
113 Id. at 1060.
114 Id. at 1061.

115 Id.
116 Id. at 1062.

Id. at 1060, 1080.
i1
Id. at 1063.
119 Id. at 1068.
117
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sion against Morison could "expose the press and its sources to criminal
sanctions, regardless
of whether any injury to the United States is intended
121
result.,
to
likely
or
In response to Morison's arguments, the Fourth Circuit found that the
United States could use Section 793 to prosecute government employees
who leaked classified information to the media. 121 In its reasoning, the
Fourth Circuit cited Branzburg v. Hayes, which held that the First
Amendment does not "'confer[ ]a license on either the reporter or his news
sources to violate valid criminal laws."1 22 Thus, logically, the court found
that the Branzburg rule applies to individuals such
as Morison who as123
sisted the media by violating valid criminal laws.
Moreover, United States v. Morison left open the possibility for the gov24
ernment to prosecute journalists for publishing classified information.'
Although the Department of Justice has yet to prosecute individual reporters who unlawfully receive classified information under the Espionage
Act, 125 the agency did not hesitate recently to indict Steven J. Rosen and
Keith Weissman, the first American, non-government
employees to face
26
charges under the modern Espionage Act.
III. UNITED STATES V. ROSEN: THE ESPIONAGE ACT TARGETS A
NEW DEMOGRAPHIC
Although United States v. Morison was important as the first mediarelated Espionage Act conviction, 27 the defendant Morison was a government employee who leaked information to the press by physical transfer of
documents and photos in violation of the Act. United States v. Rosen is the
120

Topol, supra note 103, at 591 (citing Brief for Amici Curiae, Washington Post et al.,

at 11, Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (No. 86-5008), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988)).
121See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1070-73.
122 Id. at 1068 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972)). The "valid
criminal laws" that the Morison opinion refers to are 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e), the Espionage Act statutes of which the United States had charged Morison for violating. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060. "Section (d) was applied as to the photographs, as he arguably had
authorized possession. Section (e) was applied as to the secret reports, because he had retained them without authorization." Michalec, supra note 87, at 474. The only difference
between Section (d) and Section (e) is that Section (d) pertains to those individuals who
"lawfully" have possession; whereas, Section (e) pertains to those individuals who have
"unauthorized possession." 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e) (2000). See supra note 93 for text of
Sections 793(d)-(e) of the Espionage Act.
123 See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1070.
124 Topol, supra note 103, at 591 (commenting on the decision's potential to further
infringe on freedom of the press by prosecuting journalists).
125 Editorial, Secrecy and the Media, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at M4.
126 See Government's Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Superseding Indictment at 4-5, 14-16, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05CR225 (E.D. Va.
Filed Mar. 2006); Pincus, supranote 16.
127 Topol, supra note 103, at 590.
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first case in which a court has denied a motion to dismiss the indictment on
a finding that citizens other than government employees may faces charges
for receiving and verbally disclosing secret information in violation of the
Espionage Act. 2 8 This case has far-reaching free-speech implications for a
broad segment of the public, including lobbyists, academics, journalists,
and others who work closely with high-ranking government officials. 29
A. Statement of Facts
Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman worked for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC"), "a pro-Israel organization that lobbies
the United States executive and legislative branches on issues of interest ' to
30
Israel, especially U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Middle East."'
Rosen was AIPAC's Director of Foreign Policy Issues whose primary responsibility entailed lobbying executive branch officials who had policymaking authority over issues of concern to AIPAC.13 ' Weissman was the
Senior Middle East Analyst for AIPAC who collaborated with Rosen in
lobbying executive branch officials. 32 In 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Rosen and Weissman on charges of conspiring to obtain and transmit information relating to Iran and other Middle East nations to those not
34
33
entitled to receive such reports, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(g).1
Both defendants
were also indicted for allegedly conspiring to violate Sec135
tion 793(e).
Section 793(e) pertains to the unauthorized possession of classified information. 136 The classified information obtained by Rosen and Weissman
was specifically related to United States policy toward Iran, potential attacks on American forces in Iraq, covert actions in Iraq, and other intelli128

See generally United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006); Pincus,

supra note 16.
129 The memorandum opinion on this pre-trial motion was 68 pages, which demonstrates
the magnitude of free-speech implications this case entails. See Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip
op. See also Pincus, supra note 16; Richard B. Schmitt, Lobbyists to Stand Trial in Spy
Case: A Judge Rejects the Arguments of Pro-IsraelActivists Chargedunder a 1917 Espionage Law Conspiringto Obtain U.S. Secrets, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at A13.
30 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 607. See also AIPAC: The American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, http://www.aipac.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
131 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
132 Id.
133Id.at 607; Schmitt, supra note 129.
134Section 793(g) provides:
If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this Section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for
the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.
18 U.S.C. § 793(g) (2000).
135See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 610. See supra note 93 for text of Section 793(e).
136 § 793(e).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 15

gence relating to the Middle East.'37 Lawrence Franklin, an analyst who
worked on the Iran desk in the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
Defense, 3 8 leaked the classified information in conversations with Rosen
and Weissman. 139 Franklin pled guilty to conspiracy to communicate information relating to the national defense to one not entitled to receive it,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (g).' 40 In January 2006, Franklin
was sentenced to more than 12 years in prison.' 4 '
Section 793(e) not only concerns the unauthorized possession of classified information, but also the willful communication of such information
"to any person not entitled to receive it."'142 After receipt of the information
from Franklin, Rosen and Weissman verbally transmitted the classified
information to other AIPAC colleagues, a Washington Post reporter, and
an Israeli diplomat. 143 Not only are Rosen and Weissman the first nongovernment-affiliated American citizens to face charges under the modem
Espionage Act, but they are also the only individuals the government has
ever indicted for receiving and transmitting classified information through
oral, rather than tangible, communication.' 44
Rosen and Weissman sought to dismiss the indictments by attacking the
constitutionality of Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act. 14 Rosen and
Weissman argued that the statute, as applied to them, is unconstitutionally
vague, abridges their First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition
the government, and is facially overbroad.146 In the alternative, Rosen and
Weissman urged Judge T.S. Ellis III, presiding over the case in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to interpret Section
Espionage Act as applicable to the transmission of tangible
793(e) of the
47
1
only.
items
B. Vagueness Challenge
In their motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendants argued that Section 793(e) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's allegedly inde"' Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
138

Id. at 608.

139See Jeffrey Goldberg, Real Insiders: A Pro-Israel Lobby and an F.B.I. Sting, THE

July 4, 2005, at 34 (providing a narrative of the events that led to Franklin's
indictment).
140 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608 n.3. See supra note 93 for text of Section 793(d), and
supra note 134 for text of Section 793(g).
141 Schmitt, supra note 129.
142 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000).
NEW YORKER,

143Rosen,

445 F. Supp. 2d at 609-10.

144See Id.; Pincus, supra note 16.

145 Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendants Steven J. Rosen's and Keith Weissman's Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment, supra note 6.

146

Id.

147Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
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terminate language failed to provide them with adequate notice that their
conduct was unlawful.148 They specifically alleged that the statute is vague
with respect to determining "the content of the information covered by the
phrase 'information relating to the national defense,' and.., the individuals 'not entitled to receive' that information."14' 9 Rosen and Weissman further argued that the phrase "information relating to the national defense"
does not explicitly indicate whether oral communication falls into this
category.15 ° Although Judge Ellis acknowledged that this language was not
clear, he reasoned that judicial precedent has limited and clarified "information relating to the national defense" as any government secret, the unauthorized disclosure of which could threaten the national
security. 5' Ac52
vague.
not
is
phrase
the
cordingly, Judge Ellis held that
As for "not entitled to receive," Rosen and Weissman argued that this
phrase is particularly vague, especially given the fact that they received the
information orally; they could not have known that the information was
classified because verbal communications do not possess markings such as
"SECRET," "CONFIDENTIAL," or other indicia of confidentiality.'
Once again, Judge Ellis recognized that the statutory language lacks precision; however, he reasoned that prior judicial authority "has clarified that
the statute incorporates the executive branch's classification regulations,
which provide the requisite constitutional clarity."'' 5 4 Judge Ellis, therefore,
rejected the defendants' vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of the
Espionage Act.'55
C. Constitutional Challenges on the Grounds of Free Speech and Right to
Petition the Government for Grievances
In opposing the claims in Rosen and Weissman's pretrial motion, the
government proposed a categorical rule that the Espionage Act cannot implicate the First Amendment. 5 6 Judge Ellis, demonstrating that he might
have joined the dissents of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in the first
148

149

Id. at 610.
Id. at 617 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e) (2000)).

150 Id. at 618.
' See id. at 621-22 (citing Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (requiring

that information relating to the national defense be information that the government holds
closely)); United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1988) (
"[Ijnformation relating to the national defense [requires that its]... disclosure would be
potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy of the United States."
(quoting District judge's jury instructions)).
152 Rosen, 445 F.Supp. 2d at 622.
153 Id.
154 See

id. at 623 (citing Morison, 844 F.2d at 1075).
"' See id. at 629.
156 See id. at 629-30.
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Espionage Act cases, rejected this argument and ruled that "the application
of § 793 to the defendants is unquestionably . . . deserving of First
' He elaborated that "mere invocation of 'national
Amendment scrutiny."157
security' or 'government secrecy' does not foreclose a First Amendment
'
inquiry."158
Judge Ellis acknowledged that the defendants' First Amendment interests at issue implicate core constitutional values, but ultimately held that
Section 793 does not violate Rosen and Weissman's First Amendment
guarantee of free speech and does not violate their right to petition the
government.159 Rosen and Weissman contended that their allegedly wrongful conduct was protected by their right to petition because their ability to
influence the executive and legislative branches necessarily requires "access to the sensitive information that informs the government's internal
debate over foreign policy."' 6 ° However, Judge Ellis ruled that under Morito the
son,' 61 the individual right to petition the government must yield
62
risk.
at
genuinely
is
security
national
when
interest
government's
D. Overbreadth Challenge
Rosen and Weissman additionally claimed that Section 793 unconstitutionally infringes upon First Amendment liberties because it is overbroad
and, as such, chills speech protected by the Constitution.1 63 Judge Ellis also
rejected this overbreadth challenge, citing the statutory interpretation of 6a5
6
similar provision of the Act" that was at issue in Gorin v. United States.1
Applying a Gorin analysis, Judge Ellis concluded that "the statute is narrowly and sensibly tailored to serve the government's legitimate interest in
protecting the national defense and security, and its effect on First
neither real nor substantial as judged in relation to
Amendment freedoms is
166
this legitimate sweep."'

117 Id. at 630. "[T]he conduct at issue - collecting information about United States' foreign policy and discussing that information with government officials (both United States
and foreign), journalists, and other participants in the foreign policy establishment - is at
the core of the First Amendment's guarantees." Id.
158 Id.

'59 Id. at 633, 640, 642-43.
'60 Id. at 641.
161 United States

v. Morison emphasized that Congress may limit free expression when
national security is genuinely at risk. See id. at 634 (citing United States v. Morison, 844
F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988)).
162 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
163 See id at 629.
164 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). See supra note 81 for text of Section 794(a).
165 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
166 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
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E. Argument for Interpretation of Section 793 as Only Applicable to the
Transmission of Tangible Items
Rosen and Weissman's alternative statutory argument that the court
should construe the word "information" in Section 793 as only applicable
to tangible information also failed to persuade the court. 167 Judge Ellis applied a plain meaning approach to the word, and held that it is a general
term which encompasses knowledge from both tangible and intangible
sources. 168
Judge Ellis also examined the statute's legislative history. While he acknowledged that the drafters of the Espionage Act were careless, he found
that they did not intend to restrict the term "information" to include only
tangible terms. 69 Judge Ellis reasoned that the term "information" as applicable to both tangible and intangible information is consistent with the
statute's legislative history 71 which, according to legal scholars Harold
Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., demonstrates that the drafters did not
intend to limit its reach to information only in documentary form.'
Judge Ellis further looked to an earlier statute, "[t]he grandfather of ...§
793, . . . [which] clearly prohibited the willful communication of any

'knowledge of anything connected with the national defense."",172 Inaccord
with earlier statutory language and interpretation, Judge Ellis rejected
Rosen and Weissman's alternative argument that Section 793 of the Espionage Act applies to the transmission of tangible items only, and held that
the statutory provision also allows for the government to 7prosecute under
the Espionage Act when intangible information is at issue. 1
F. A Partial Victory for Rosen and Weissman
Although Judge Ellis rejected Rosen and Weissman's motion to dismiss,
he interpreted Section 793 at least partially in the defendants' favor.'74 In
order for the government to obtain a conviction at trial, Judge Ellis ruled
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rosen and
Weissman knew that the United States held the information at issue
167

See id. at 614.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 613-14.

170 See id. at 616-17.
171 Id. at 616 (citing Harold

Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and
Publicationof Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 1021-31, 1050 (1973)).
172 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
171See id. at 615-17.
174

See id.See also Pincus, supra note 16. "The federal judge who... refused to throw

out charges of conspiring to violate the 1917 Espionage Act against two former pro-Israel
lobbyists simultaneously made it much more difficult for the government to prove its case
against them." Id.
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closely, that the disclosure of such information could potentially harm the
United States, and that they knew that the individuals to whom they communicated that information
lacked authority under the classification regula175
tions to receive it.
Furthermore, Judge Ellis found that Section 793 requires a bad faith element for conviction. Accordingly, he held that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendants communicated the information they had received from their government sources with 'a bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law."", 17 6 Although Judge Ellis
held that Section 793 passes constitutional muster, his memorandum opinion on the defendants' motion to dismiss, particularly the orders requiring
both proof of knowledge and bad faith for conviction, casts doubt on the
government's ultimate success in this case.
G. Dicta in Favor of Journalists, Academics, Think-tank Experts, and
Other Individuals
The court also acknowledged that Rosen and Weissman's "First
Amendment challenge exposes the inherent tension between the government transparency so essential to a democratic society and the government's equally compelling need to protect from disclosure information that
could be used by those who wish this nation harm."' 7 7 In fact, at the close
of his memorandum opinion, Judge Ellis wrote, "[t]he conclusion that the
statute is constitutionally permissible does not reflect a judgment about
whether Congress could strike a more appropriate balance between these
competing interests, or whether a more carefully drawn statute could better
serve both the national security and the value of public debate."' 78 Judge
Ellis reasoned that "great technological advances affecting not only the
nature and potential devastation of modern warfare, but also the very nature of information and communication... suggest to even the most casual
observer that the time is ripe for Congress to engage in a thorough review
and revision" of the Espionage Act's provisions, "to ensure that they reflect both these changes, and contemporary views about the appropriate
balance between our nation's security and our citizens' ability to engage in
public debate about the United States' conduct in the society of nations."'79
Although Judge Ellis held that Section 793 of the Espionage Act is constitutional under First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth doctrinal
tests, he nonetheless indicated that he does not necessarily praise its provisions, which place unreasonable restrictions on the public discourse and
175 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
176

Id. (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988)).

177 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
178

Id. at 646.

179

Id. at 667-68.
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the marketplace of ideas. Thus, even as he followed judicial authority and
legislative history, Judge Ellis found it necessary to call on Congress to readdress the proper tradeoff between national security and free-speech
rights in the communicatively advanced post-modem era.
IV. SECTION 793 INHIBITS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
SPEECH
Pursuant to precedent, Judge Ellis rejected the vagueness and overbreadth challenges raised by Rosen and Weissman. 8 ' However, leading
journalists and publications suggest that the court decisions in Gorin, Morison, and Rosen failed to take into consideration the reality of the everyday situations facing journalists, lobbyists, academics, think-tank experts,
and others, particularly in Washington, whose daily stock in trade is the
acquisition and exchange of information, often secret or classified. 8' Journalist fear that the potential for criminal prosecution under the Act as envisioned by these rulings will chill and frustrate the free-flow of information,
classified or not, that is vital to the daily workings of Washington.'82
Moreover, these holdings could allow the scope of prosecution under the
Espionage Act to expand to a point where the First Amendment rights of
journalists and others could be seriously jeopardized. 183 According to Paul
McMasters, a former journalist and current ombudsman at the First
Amendment Center, "[i]f this can happen to those people at AIPAC, it can
happen to journalists."' 84 McMasters explains that the AIPAC case presents
a "danger of opening another front that would restrict the ability of the
American press to bring information to the American people."' 85
Critics of Judge Ellis's opinion argue that he should have ruled as U.S.
District Judge Audrey Collins did in Humanitarian Law Project v.
Ashcroft. 8 6 In HumanitarianLaw Project, the court struck down terms of

180 See generally Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602. See, e.g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S.
19, 28 (1941). Gorin rejected a vagueness challenge to the "information relating to the
national defense" clause in Section 2(a) of Section 794(a), a provision of the Espionage Act
with similar wording to Section 793(e). Id. See supra note 81 for text of Section 794(a); and
supra note 93 for text of Section 793(e).
18! See Joan Indiana Rigdon, Crime or Privilege? Leaking Classified Information,
WASH. LAW., May 2006, at 21; EspionageActing, supra note 7.
182 See Rigdon, supra note 181.
183

Id.

18
185

Id. (quoting McMasters).
Id (quoting McMasters). Contra Eastman, supra note 104, at 13-14. Eastman argues

that the executive branch should be able to prosecute journalists who disclose "classified,
highly-sensitive intelligence-gathering information." Id. at 14.
186 Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 15

the USA PATRIOT Act'87 that banned the provision of expert advice or
assistance by any citizen to groups that the federal government had designated as terrorist organizations.' Judge Collins held that this provision
was unconstitutionally vague because a court could construe "expert advice or assistance" to include innocent contacts that are unequivocally pure
speech or advocacy afforded First Amendment protection.18 9 This type of
statutory interpretation leads to the frustration of communication that is
vital in a functioning democracy. Finding that the provision inherently
created an undue chilling effect on free speech because "expert advice or
assistance" was not sufficiently clear to allow persons of common intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what was prohibited,' 90 the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California appropriately overturned it. Critics of Judge Ellis's opinion in the Rosen case argue that the
ambiguous provisions of the Espionage Act not only are so overbroad that
they chill speech, but also are so unconstitutionally vague that they easily
could lead to the criminal prosecution of journalists. 9 1
A. Vagueness
Under the vagueness doctrine, criminal statutes "either standing alone or
as construed, [must make] reasonably clear at the relevant time that the
defendant's conduct was criminal."' 92 The premise of this doctrine is that
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 93 requires the government
to provide fair warning to potential defendants that their conduct or speech
may be unlawful. 94 Concerns that vague statutes could encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement further buttress the vagueness doctrine's
necessity.' 95
187

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
188 HumanitarianLaw Project, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; John Mintz, Part of PatriotAct
Struck Down: Ban on 'Expert Advice' to Terrorist Groups Vague, Judge Says, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 2004, at A15.
189HumanitarianLaw Project, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; Mintz, supra note 188.
190 HumanitarianLaw Project, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. See supranote 9 for a definition
of chilling effect.
191 See EspionageActing, supra note 7; Bruce Fein, A More Secret Government?, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at A15. See also Secrecy and the Media, supra note 125 (suggesting
that Judge Ellis should have accepted Rosen and Weissman's vagueness argument).
192 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997). See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). "'Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."' Id. at 604
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)).
193 U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 617 (E.D. Va. 2006); City of Chi. v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
195See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 617; Morales, 527 U.S. at 56.
194
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In Rosen, Judge Ellis ruled that Section 793(e) passes constitutional muster under the vagueness doctrine because prior courts have narrowly construed the statutory phrase "information relating to the national defense" as
referring to information that is "'potentially damaging to the United States
or might be useful to an enemy."" 96 However, Jane Kirtley, University of
Minnesota professor of media ethics and law, counters that Judge Ellis's
reasoning "'is predicated on an idea that the executive and judicial
branches will operate with rectitude and only prosecute cases where there
is a genuine risk of harming national security' rather than political considerations .... [This] 'presumes
a degree of honest government that, sadly,
97
does not always exist."1
Others have also asserted that Section 793's vagueness creates the potential for selective prosecution and political abuse against partisan enemies.1 9 These critics contend that on any given day in Washington, journalists, lobbyists, and others orally receive and dispatch classified information for which they lack authorized possession, and which will eventually
appear in print or on the air.199 However, often these "secrets" are not
"truly vital to national security but have been classified for political reasons, or because information
is power and many bureaucrats like to control
200
information.,
of
flow
the
According to Geoffrey R. Stone, the Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished
Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, there are three different types of secrets: "illegitimate" government secrets, "legitimate but
newsworthy" government secrets, and "legitimate and non-newsworthy"
government secrets.2 1 In the illegitimate category of secrets, government
officials are "attempting to shield from public scrutiny their own misjudgments, incompetence, misconduct, venality, cupidity, corruption, or criminality., 20 2 Stone suggests that government officials who wish to "maintain
such secrets may invoke the claim of national security as a cover. '203

196

See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d

1057, 1084 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips, J., concurring)).
197 Schmitt, supra note 129 (quoting Jane Kirtley, University of Minnesota Professor
of
Media Ethics and Law).
198 See Rigdon, supra note 181; EspionageActing, supra note 7.
199 See Rigdon, supra note 181.
What is remarkable is that the alleged spies are being prosecuted not for stealing or
paying for classified information, but for knowingly receiving it in conversation and
then passing it on-something that lobbyists, journalists, lawyers, government officials, diplomats, policy wonks, and many others do every day in the course of their
jobs.
Id.
200 EspionageActing, supra note 7.
201 Stone, Letter, supra note 18.
202 id.
203 id.
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For example, on November 20, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") received a subpoena ordering the return of a classified
document that Stone might consider an illegitimate government secret.24
According to the ACLU, although the document at issue is classified, it is
only "mildly embarrassing" to the government and "has nothing to do with
national defense. 2 5 Federal prosecutors, nonetheless, targeted the ACLU
for obtaining this classified information in violation of the Espionage
Act.20 6 Because the Department of Justice cannot possibly investigate every
retention or leak of classified information, the potential for selective prosecution and political abuse is glaring.0 7
Some outspoken critics of Rosen not only consider the current prosecution of Rosen and Weissman as an example of bureaucratic aggression, but
also claim that the government's use of the Espionage Act in this case
"amounts to the imposition, by executive fiat, of a U.S. version of Britain's
Official Secrets Act. 20 8 The Official Secrets Act includes a type of prior
restraint on the press that criminalizes the publication of classified material.20 9 Such restriction on the freedom of speech and the press is "alien to
the American legal tradition of First Amendment rights."2 ° According to
the ACLU, "[n]o official secrets act has yet been enacted into law, and the
grand jury's subpoena power cannot be employed to create one. 211
204

See Dan Eggen, U.S. Gets Subpoena to Force ACLU to Return Leaked Memo, WASH.

POST, Dec. 14, 2006, at A8; Adam Liptak, U.S. Subpoena Is Seen as Bid to Stop Leaks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Liptak, U.S. Subpoena]. On December 18,
2006, federal prosecutors withdrew the subpoena. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutors Drop
A. CL.U.Subpoena in Document Fight,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2006, at A26.
205 Eggen, supra note 204 (quoting the ACLU). See also Editorial, Pentagon Papers
Revisited: The Bush Administration's Ever-Expanding War on the First Amendment,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2006, at A34 [hereinafter Pentagon Papers Revisited]. "This subpoena, as the ACLU argues, has no 'investigatory purpose' but only a 'confiscatory, information-suppressive one."' Id (quoting the ACLU).
206 See Eggen, supra note 204. See also Pentagon Papers Revisited, supra note 205
(arguing that a federal judge should grant the ACLU's request to quash the subpoena). But
see Liptak, U.S. Subpoena, supra note 204. "'Assuming [the document']s properly classified, . . . I actually think the government is bending over backwards to accommodate the
A.C.L.U. rather than pulling the trigger in prosecuting them."' Id. (quoting John C. Eastman, law professor, Chapman University).
207 See EspionageActing, supra note 7.
208 Id. See also Goldberg, supra note 139. Goldberg describes the Official Secrets Act as

"the British law that makes journalists liable to prosecution if they publish classified material." Id.
209 See Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6 (Eng.). See also Secrecy and the Media, supra
note 125. If the U.S. District Court finds
uphold their convictions, "the Espionage
Secrets Act" that the government could use
210 EspionageActing, supra note 7.
211 Eggen, supra note 204 (quoting the

Rosen and Weissman guilty and higher courts
Act could mutate into a British-style Official
against journalists. Id.
ACLU after federal prosecutors issued a grand

jury subpoena demanding that the organization turn over all copies of a classified document). See Editorial, A Gag on Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A40. "The sub-
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The effect of a de facto American Official Secrets Act on the press
would contradict the legislative history of the Espionage Act, which became law only after Congress eliminated language that would have punished newspapers for articles determined by the President to be useful to
the enemy2"' Furthermore, the government will compromise the First
Amendment if it decides to prosecute journalists under the Espionage Act.
Since the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, no federal legislation
23
has ever prohibited the press from publishing government secrets,
thereby fulfilling the promise of the First Amendment, that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom . .. of the press.' , 214 In fact, the
federal government has never imposed criminal sanctions on the press for
publishing government secrets.2" 5 If the Department of Justice abridges the
freedom of the press by prosecuting journalists for the publication of classified information under Section 793(e), the marketplace of ideas and the
public's awareness about the workings of government could become drastically limited.216 As Justice Potter Stewart's concurring opinion in New
York Times Co. v. United States expressed, "a press that is alert, aware, and
free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For
without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people. 217

poena is also a prior restraint because the government is trying to stop the A.C.L.U. in advance from speaking about the document's contents." Id.See also Pentagon Papers Revisited, supra note 205. "If the ACLU, which advocates and litigates on issues of public policy, can be forced to comply with such a subpoena, news organizations would be similarly
at risk." Id.
212 Secrecy and the Media, supra note 125.
213 Stone, Letter, supra note 18.
214 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Stone, Letter, supra note 18
According to the ACLU:
Many of the most important news articles of [2006] (such as those concerning N.S.A.
eavesdropping, rendition of foreign prisoners of our nation to others nations, Defense
Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld's views on the deteriorating situation in Iraq, National
Security Advisor [Stephen] Hadley's assessment of Iraqi Prime Minister [Nuri al-I
Maliki, and the report on the Iraq insurgency's funding sources) have been based on
classified documents leaked to reporters ....
215
216

Liptak, U.S. Subpoena, supra note 204 (quoting the ACLU). But cf Eastman, supra note

104, at 13 ("The constitutionality of protecting intelligence gathering and other operational
military secrets in time of war is ...beyond dispute and the institutional press is no more
permitted to ignore the legal restrictions imposed by the Espionage Act ...than are ordinary citizens.")
217 New York Times Co. v. United States (PentagonPapers), 403 U.S. 713, 728 (Stew-

art, J., concurring).
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B. Overbreadth
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth declares that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to..
. regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."2 8 This doctrine developed out of concern that "[m]any persons, rather than undertake
the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights
through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech, harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which
is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."2 9 Thus, to minimize
this burden on the citizenry, the Supreme Court has demanded that Congress seek the narrowest means available to carry out a government interest.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected
Rosen and Weissman's overbreadth challenge to Section 793, citing
Gorin.22 Judge Ellis reasoned that the language of Section 793 does not
sweep too broadly because the Supreme Court in Gorin narrowly construed
a similar statutory provision of the Act 22 to include only the bad faith release of classified information that could endanger the United States via
disclosure. 2
However, some individuals who are not parties in the Rosen case continue to urge dismissal of the indictment, notwithstanding Judge Ellis's
ruling, on the argument that the Espionage Act is in fact unconstitutionally
overbroad.223 According to Bruce Fein, a constitutional lawyer and former
Justice Department official in the Reagan administration, 24 "[t]he Espionage Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because it makes no distinction
between genuine and contrived dangers despite the common knowledge
that presidents instinctively exaggerate to justify secrecy. 225 Other legal
experts suggest that Judge Ellis's failure to acknowledge this reality could
chill the ability of lobbyists, academics, and journalists "to learn about the
inner workings of government
and expose misconduct or controversial
226
programs of public interest.,
218
219
220

NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citing Gorin v.

United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941)).
221 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). See supra note 81 for text of Section 794(a).
222 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (citing Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28).
223
224

See Fein, supra note 191.

The Lichfield Group, Principals, http://www.thelichfieldgroup.com/principals (last
visited Jan. 31, 2007).
225 Id.
226 Schmitt,

supra note 129. In addition, Richard Sauber, a partner specializing in First
Amendment law at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, suggests that prosecutors
in cases such as Rosen are attempting to criminalize practices in Washington that are not
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David Carr of the New York Times observed that no one knows the number of stories the media is now failing to report out of fear of prosecution.227 According to Carr, at least "one [story] collapsed because of the
pervasive chill in the air," the result of journalists and others who fuel the
public discourse increasingly becoming the targets of law enforcement
investigations.2 28 Therefore, the overbreadth doctrine that exists to prevent
the chilling of the public discourse seems to be yielding to the executive
enforcement and judicial approval of a statute that many have acknowl229
edged is overly broad on its face.
V. SOLUTIONS FOR CONGRESS TO MORE EFFECTIVELY
BALANCE FREE-SPEECH RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS
To prevent further abridgment of the press and free-speech rights, Congress must revise the Espionage Act. If Congress engages in this task, it
can more effectively carry out the Act's purpose of protecting the national
defense of the United States without undermining the fundamental First
Amendment rights of American citizens. Bruce Fein argues that, independent of appellate review, "Congress should amend the Espionage Act to
strike a more prudent balance between national security and freedom of the
press."23 Furthermore, despite his preliminary dismissal of Rosen and
Weissman's constitutional arguments of vagueness and overbreadth
against their prosecution under the Espionage Act, Judge Ellis acknowledged that "the time is ripe for Congress to engage in a thorough review
and revision of the [Espionage Act's] provisions .... 23 ,

just frequent, but are actually in the interest of the United States. Rigdon, supra note 181
(referencing Sauber).
227 David Carr, An Obsession with Leaks and Plugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 25, 2006, at C1.
228 Id. (mentioning, for example, that the Bush Administration is investigating who may
have leaked information to reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau for their series of
articles on the National Security Agency's policy on listening to domestic phone calls).
229 See Fein, supra note 191. See also A Leaky Espionage Law, supra note 8.
"Congress
wrote an unconstitutionally broad law that has let the judge further blur the line between
leakers, who often have been subjected to abusive prosecution, and the recipients of leaked
information, including private citizens." Id.
230 Fein, supra note 191. See also A Leaky Espionage Law, supra note 8 (suggesting
that
Congress should revise the Espionage Act because it is vague and overbroad in its current
form). But see Gabriel Schoenfeld, All the News That's Fit to Prosecute: Should the DOJ
Go after Journalists?,WKLY. STANDARD, July 17, 2006, at 19. "[T]he remedy for our current dilemmas probably does not lie in drafting new legislation. It would be far better to see
that existing law is stringently enforced." Id.
231 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 646 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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A. Revising the "Reason to Believe" Clause
To better serve the public discourse and, accordingly, the marketplace of
ideas, Congress should replace the clause "reason to believe could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign na'
tion"232
with "knew could be used to the injury of the United States or to
the advantage of any foreign nation" in Sections 793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act. If the "reason to believe" clause remains part of the statutory
language, "predictability will largely be sacrificed with a resulting chill on
publication ... 233 Not only will the "reason to believe" clause continue
to yield an undesirable chilling effect on speech,2 34 but it could also enable
the executive branch to punish individuals lacking bad faith intent through
a lengthy prison sentence or costly fine.235 If the United States truly values
the freedom of speech as a fundamental right as the Supreme Court has
consistently decreed,2 36 Congress must amend the Espionage Act to ensure
that the federal government does not unjustly punish the exercise of this
liberty.
Judge Ellis noted that Sections 793(d) and (e) prohibit the communication of information the possessor has mere "reason to believe could be used
to the injury of the United States" rather than actual knowledge of its
harmful potential.2 37 He explained that this language could "subject nongovernmental employees to prosecution for the innocent, albeit negligent,
disclosure of information relating to the national defense., 238 Noted Judge
Ellis, "[p]unishing defendants engaged in public debate for unwittingly
harming a legitimate government interest is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.." 239 Therefore, as counterbalance,
Judge Ellis added weight to the prosecution's burden in seeking convictions of Rosen and Weissman, ruling that "information relating to the national defense, whether tangible or intangible, must necessarily be information which if disclosed, is potentially harmful to the United States, and the
232
233

18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e) (2000).
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 171, at 1087. Their comment additionally suggested

that the Espionage Act has "room for improvement," and that it needs "clarification by
legislation ..." See id at 1076-77. But see Schoenfeld, supra note 230.
234
235

See supranote 9 for definition of "chilling effect."
Penalties for violation include up to ten years in prison or up to $10,000 in fines. 18

U.S.C. § 793 (2000).

"Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925); Strongberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
236

697, 707 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)).
237 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 640-41 (E.D. Va. 2006).
238 Id.at 640.
239 Id. (citing BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516 (2002); New York

Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)).
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defendant must know that disclosure of the information is potentially harmful to the United States. 24 °
However, Judge Ellis's statutory analysis and interpretation regarding the
"reason to believe" clause is not controlling outside of the Eastern District
of Virginia. Therefore, Congress must replace "reason to believe" with
"knew" in order to ensure uniform First Amendment rights among all jurisdictions.
B. Revising "to the advantage of any foreign nation"
Congress would not jeopardize national security if it removed "to the advantage of any foreign nation" from Sections 793(d) and (e). 24' Any information disclosed to an enemy of the United States would inherently qualify
under the "could be used to the injury of the United States" clause.
Alternatively, Congress could replace "to the advantage of any foreign
nation" with "to an enemy of the United States" or "to the advantage of an
enemy of the United States" in order to ensure that the federal courts
would find such disclosure unlawful.242 An enemy of the United States
should include anyone who could qualify as a lawful or unlawful enemy
combatant under the Military Commissions Act of 2006.243 Thus, the statute would cover both state actors under the "lawful enemy combatant"
definition, 244 and non-state actors under the "unlawful enemy combatant"
definition.245 By editing the "to the advantage of any foreign nation" clause
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (emphasis added). See also Pincus, supra note 16
(reporting that First Amendment advocates contend that this ruling will make it more difficult to successfully prosecute Espionage Act charges against private citizens).
241 See supra note 93 for text of Sections 793(d)-(e) of the Espionage Act.
242 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1084 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J.,
240

concurring). Judge Phillips insisted on instructing a jury to limit "[information] relating to
the national defense" to information "potentially damaging to the United States or ... useful to an enemy of the United States." Id. at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
243 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in
scattered sections of 10 and 18 U.S.C.).
244 The Military Commissions Act of 2006 provides:
The term "lawful enemy combatant" means a person who is-(A) a member of the
regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United States; (B) a
member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging to a
State party engaged in such hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by
the law of war; or (C) a member of a regular armed force who possesses allegiance to
a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States.
§ 948a(2), 120 Stat. 2601.
245 The Military Commissions Act of 2006 provides:
The term "unlawful enemy combatant" means--(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person
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in this fashion, Congress would effectively widen the scope of classified
information on which journalists could report without threat of prosecution, thereby contributing more to the marketplace of ideas and enlightening Americans without jeopardizing national security.
In his memorandum opinion, Judge Ellis focused on the language of Sections 793(d) and (e) that prohibits the communication of "information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation' ' 246 upon disclosure.247 According to Judge Ellis, such language implies that the statute would "permit prosecution for the communication of information in instances where
there is no reason to believe the information could harm the United States,
but there is reason to believe it could be used to the advantage of a foreign
nation., 241 Judge Ellis rejected this type of prosecution as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment and inconsistent with the statute's purpose of
protecting the national defense and security of the United States without
unduly burdening civil rights.249
Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand actually observed this same shortcoming of the Act long before the indictments of Rosen and Weissman:
[The Espionage Act] as enacted necessarily implies that there are some kinds of information 'relating to the national defense' which must not be given to a friendly power,
not even to an ally, no matter how innocent, or even commendable, the purpose of the
sender may be. Obviously, so drastic a repression of the free exchange of information
4
result.25 0
it is wise carefully to scrutinize, lest extravag l ind absurd consequences

However, not all federal courts will foilow the statutory analysis and interpretation of Judges Ellis and Hand because they are binding precedent
only within their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, heeding Ellis and
Hand, Congress should revise the "to the advantage of any foreign nation"
clause in Sections 793(d) and (e).
Revision of the "to the advantage of any foreign nation" clause is necessary because the disclosure of information to the advantage of key allies of
the United States, such as Israel in this case, could actually be beneficial in

who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person who, before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President
or the Secretary of Defense.
Id.
246 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e) (2000) (emphasis added).
247 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 640 (E.D. Va. 2006).
248 Id.
249 Id. Judge Ellis also demonstrated the absurdity of the statutory language by suggesting that it could "reach disclosure of the government's closely held secret that a foreign
nation is sitting atop a huge oil reserve, when the disclosure of such information cannot
plausibly cause harm to the United States." Id.
250 United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1945).
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a time of war.251 Accordingly such communication should fall under First
Amendment protection. This revision, along with the replacement of "information the possessor has reason to believe" with "information the possessor has reason to know," would still heavily take into account the national interest in defense and security while simultaneously advancing the
individual interest in freedom that the Framers of the Bill of Rights held
dear and that present-day Americans cherish.
C. The Probability of Revision
Some, however, are skeptical about congressional amendments to the
Espionage Act in the current political climate. Lucy Dalglish, executive
director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, finds the
idea of Congress addressing this issue "'a distressing thought.' ' 2 52 As an
example of her concern, Dalglish points to a bill introduced by Republican
Senator Christopher S. Bond from Missouri that would prosecute government employees who leaked classified information; however, the prosecution would not need to demonstrate harm to the United States or aid to a
foreign government in order to prove guilt.253 As this bill demonstrates,
Congress might act upon the court's recommendation to review the Espionage Act, but the representatives and senators might revise it in a way that
would be entirely inconsistent with Judge Ellis's opinion. 4
Moreover, congressional indifference to First Amendment freedoms is
not unique to the post-9/1 1 era. President Bill Clinton, during his tenure,
vetoed a bill similar to the bill that Senator Bond introduced.2 5 The fact
that the House of Representatives and the Senate passed such a measure
before September 11, 2001, unfortunately demonstrates that Congress has
been disinclined to act in the interest of the public discourse in the past,
even in the face of relative peace. The introduction of similar legislation by
Senator Bond even as more journalists come under fire shows that Congress has had no interest in changing course.
The President can oftentimes effectively lobby Congress to engage in
certain statutory revision, but the Bush Administration has refused to un-

See discussion supranote 226.
16 (quoting Lucy Dalglish).
253 Id.See also S. 3774, 109th Cong. (2006).
254 On the other hand, S.3774 remained in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the
closing of the 109th Congress, and could cease to exist after the inauguration of the 110th
Congress which, unlike the 109th Congress, is comprised of a Democratic Party majority.
See Bruce Fein, Pelosi's Chance to Be Lady Liberty, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at A 17.
Fein recommends that the agenda of incoming Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi should
include "amedia exception to criminal prosecutions for disclosing national defense information under the Espionage Act of 1917." Id.
255 Pincus, supra note 16. See generally H.R. 5630, 106th Cong. (2000).
251

252Pincus, supra note
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dertake such an endeavor regarding the Espionage Act. 6 In October of
2002, the Bush administration decided that no changes were necessary
after carrying out a review of secrecy laws. 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must revise the Espionage Act. A revision is necessary in order
to more effectively carry out the Act's purpose of guarding and protecting
the national defense of the United States, while simultaneously protecting
the fundamental First Amendment rights of American citizens. Historically, the United States has been a beacon for democracy because of its
exemplary balance in the tradeoff between security and freedom. A revision that allows for more exercise of First Amendment rights than the Espionage Act in its current form would help to maintain this equilibrium.
Unfortunately, such a revision is not likely to occur, if ever, until after the
2008 Presidential election with the advent of an agenda from a new administration.

256
257

See Pincus, supranote 16.
Id.

